This paper studies firms' choices of internal versus external sources of new capabilities. We first compare transaction cost, knowledge-based, and institutional arguments, which all emphasize the attributes of capabilities, including contractual hazards, capability gaps, and legitimacy. We next contrast these arguments with propositions that emphasize constraints on external availability as drivers of internal development. We then propose that a firm's internal reconfiguration and external reconfiguration routines affect its capability sourcing decisions as interactions with the capability attributes and external constraints. The empirical analysis draws on a survey of 162 telecommunications firms operating in Europe, North America, Latin America, or Asia.
Firms regularly must chose between internal and external sources to obtain new capabilities. Existing research suggests that three attributes of needed capabilities influence the decisions, including the degree of transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) , the extent of existing knowledge stocks (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996) , and how needed capabilities fit with internal institutional norms (Oliver, 1997) . This research has three limits.
First, few studies examine the three types of capability attributes together, so that it is not clear whether one set of factors dominates the others. Second, studies rarely ask whether the apparent influence of capability attributes simply masks external constraints that force firms to choose internal development, either because external capabilities do not exist or because firms lack the ability to import external capabilities. Third, little research assesses firm-specific differences in the ability to manage internal and external exchanges of seemingly similar capabilities. Thus, we need a more general understanding of how firms obtain new capabilities. This paper develops a framework for assessing firms' capability sourcing choices. We first examine the transaction cost, knowledge-based, and institutional arguments. These arguments share an emphasis on the attributes of capabilities. We next consider an alternative argument to the influence of capability attributes, which is that external constraints determine firms' choices of internal development. Finally, we develop the concept of firm-specific reconfiguration routines, proposing that a firm's internal and external reconfiguration routines moderate its capability sourcing decisions as interactions with the capability attributes and external constraints.
The empirical analysis draws on a detailed survey of 162 telecommunications firms operating in Europe, North America, Latin America, or Asia in [2000] [2001] . The international telecom industry provides rich data concerning the processes by which firms change as they seek to acquire new capabilities in the face of rapid industry changes. The telecom industry has faced intensive deregulation, price competition, telecom and information technology convergence, and foreign competition in recent years. Firms in the industry have used multiple modes of capability acquisition in the face of such pressures.
Our results suggest that internal development and external sourcing present differences in their capacity to cope with contractual hazards, strategic gaps, and internal legitimacy difficulties. Consistent with transaction cost arguments, we find that managers are more likely to choose internal development over external sourcing when the targeted capabilities face contractual hazards. Consistent with knowledge-based theorists, we find that firms prefer internal development over external sourcing when the strategic gap between the targeted capabilities and the firm's existing capabilities is narrow. Consistent with institutional theorists, we find that internal development is more suitable than external sourcing to develop capabilities that do not depart significantly from the firm's routines and social values. In turn, though, we also find that some reconfiguration routines moderate the capability attributes. The results contribute to a more general understanding of how firms seek new capabilities when they face environmental pressures to change, while also identifying constraints that limit their ability to select modes of change.
DEFINITIONS
We distinguish between internal development and external sourcing. Internal development refers to the changes that a firm undertakes by recombining its existing resources or developing new resources on its own. Examples of internal development include internal training, internal product development, and building new plants. External sourcing means trading in a strategic capability that stems from external sources. Trading in a strategic capability can occur by one of the three means (Chi, 1994) : 1) purchase of a resource or service from the firm that possesses it, 2) collaborative ventures that transfer skills and organization routines, and 3) acquisition of an entire firm or part of a firm in which the resource resides. Thus, we define three modes of external sourcing: purchase contract, alliances, and outright acquisition. Purchase contracts are cases in which firms buy distinct resources from third parties, such as purchasing off-the-shelf technologies and services, licensing technology, hiring and employing consulting services. Alliances are ongoing relationships with other organizations that retain strategic autonomy but agree to work together for a period of time. Examples of alliances include equity and non-equity joint ventures, R&D and marketing partnerships, and multi-party consortia.
Acquisitions involve obtaining majority control of another firm or entity, and encompass both acquiring entire corporations and acquiring individual businesses from ongoing multi-business corporations. Of course, no knowledge is entirely internally accumulated or externally acquired (Foss and Eriksen, 1995) . Nevertheless, some knowledge largely is internally produced, while other knowledge derives strongly from external knowledge inputs.
The study groups the three external modes into a single external category, which we will compare to internal development. We recognize that the conceptual split between internal and external capability sourcing masks significant variation within the external category. The advantages and disadvantages of the external modes (purchase contracts, alliances, acquisitions) differ from one another, and accordingly, they might be appropriate responses to distinct situations, such that finer conceptual distinctions arise within the external sourcing category. For example, Cassiman & Veugelers (1999) classify the external modes of sourcing according to their nature as embodied (acquisitions) or disembodied (licensing, R&D contracting) activities. Leonard (1995) ranges the different modes of external sourcing along a continuum expressing the extent of mutual commitment between the parties implied by the particular form of agreement (from nonexclusive licensing and R&D contracts to full acquisitions). She also ranges these modes according to their potential for acquiring an entire new capability, with acquisitions and joint ventures being more suitable to acquire a new core capability than nonexclusive licenses and R&D contracts.
Although differences among the different external sourcing modes will be important in extending our understanding on how firms create new capabilities, their study is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the paper focuses on the firm's choice between internal and external sourcing modes, so that we can understand the factors that enable and constrain the firm to pursue internal development and the conditions that trigger an external search process. As we investigate this research question, we bear in mind that the external modes of capability acquisition -and the conditions that might evoke them -differ from one another. Indeed, we view the three external sourcing modes as part of a continuum, where the motives for turning to external sourcing get stronger as firms move from purchase contract to an outright acquisition, with collaboration being between these two extreme external modes. In that sense, the drivers for the external modes are similar, but may change in magnitude. Moreover, while we focus on the choice between internal and external pursuit of new capabilities, we recognize that a firm may chose not to pursue needed capabilities at all. Figure 1 depicts the model that we develop in the paper. The model combines three forms of capability exchange attributes with alternative explanations based on external constraints. In addition, the model considers how a firm's internal and external reconfiguration routines will moderate the capability attributes and external constraints. ********** Figure 1 here **********
THEORY

Firm Boundary Choice as a Function of Capability Exchange Attributes
Transaction-based attributes. A substantial body of conceptual and empirical work suggests that transaction costs influence governance structure choices. The central argument of transaction cost economics is that firms prefer internal sourcing instead of trading in capabilities when the transaction is subject to high transaction costs, whether ex ante costs of search and negotiation or ex post costs to execute and enforce the contract, because such transactions place firms at risk of opportunistic behavior by external agents (Williamson, 1975) . The probability of observing transaction costs depends upon the underlying properties of the transaction, such that a higher degree of transaction-specific assets, greater uncertainty, or more frequent exchange lead to more integrated governance.
Asset specificity has a particularly strong impact on governance choices, because it increases the degree of market failures that external exchanges would face (Williamson, 1985) .
Asset specificity increases the need for contractual safeguards because it has the effect of placing contracting parties in a dependency relationship. As a result, this relationship can entail underinvestment by the supplier, which has little incentive to make specific investments that are of lesser value in alternative uses and whose rents can be appropriated by the buyer. Assetspecificity can also create ex-post bargaining problems, because partners have incentives to appropriate the quasi rents that transaction-specific investments create (Klein et al., 1978) .
These market failures decline when firms bring capability development within their boundaries. Internal organization enjoys three kinds of advantages over market modes of contracting when transaction-specificity is high (Williamson, 1975) . First, the parties to an internal exchange are less able to appropriate subgroup gains at the expense of the overall organization. Second, firms often can audit internal organization more effectively. Third, the organization realizes an advantage in dispute settling.
Internal organization not only serves to curb opportunism but also adds centralized coordinating properties that are critical as relationship-specific investments increase (Coase, 1937) . The knowledge-based perspective, which emphasizes the firm's coordinating properties, echoes this theme. Relative to markets, organizations provide governance and socialization mechanisms for transferring routines across firms because they act as social communities, which create productive and administrative routines embodied in people and procedures (Kogut and Zander, 1996) . The opportunism and coordination forms of market failure tend to arise jointly, as the same factors that give rise to the need for ongoing cooperation also create opportunism risks. TCE and knowledge-based theorists reach a common prediction concerning boundary choice: increasing asset specificity leads to the diminishing effectiveness of market governance and promotes the choice of internal organization. Numerous empirical studies support this prediction (Monteverde and Teece; Anderson and Schmittlein, 1984; Joskow, 1985; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989; Pisano 1990 ). For example, Mowery and Rosenberg, (1989) find that R&D contracting is more likely to occur for generic, non-firm specific R&D. Using data from biotech projects from pharmaceuticals companies, Pisano (1990) finds support for the small number hazard problem as a driver of internal sourcing.
Transaction costs also arise because of capability leakage (Teece, 1986; Gulati and Singh, 1998) . Trading with a third party entails risks of uncontrolled knowledge spillovers. The third party that obtains proprietary knowledge has incentives to expropriate that knowledge for its own use or to leak it to competitors (Liebeskind, 1996:96) . Unlike exchanges on external markets, the particular governance capabilities of firms protect resource value from appropriation more effectively than the market by aligning incentives among the contracting parties (Teece, 1986; Chi, 1994) . Liebeskind (1996:94) notes that "Firms, as institutions, play a critical role of protecting valuable knowledge. Specifically, because property rights in knowledge are weak, and are costly to write and enforce, firms are able to use an array of organizational arrangements that are not available in markets to protect the value of knowledge". When the targeted capability is of high strategic value to the firm, internal development can provide stronger safeguards than markets to protect its value and prevent leakage to third party.
In summary, sourcing new capabilities from external partners meets frictions due to the presence of contractual hazards, including supplier underinvestment, opportunistic expropriation in relation-specific transaction, and leakage of proprietary knowledge. This influence applies to all three forms of external sourcing. First, contractual hazards interfere with the ability to undertake purchase contracts. Second, contractual hazards limit a firm's ability to negotiate and manage alliances. Third, contractual hazards limit a firm's ability to undertake acquisitions, by interfering with attempts to undertake due diligence needed to determine prices and terms. Hypothesis 1. A firm is likely to use internal development rather than external sourcing when the targeted capabilities face high contractual hazards.
Although there has been considerable empirical support for the TCE framework, some scholars have questioned the approach. One question concerns whether the effects of asset specificity on the performance of internally governed exchange differ in any way from the effects of asset specificity on market performance. Eccles and White (1988) contend that the same problems of bargaining and negotiation that plague market exchanges also plague exchanges governed by hierarchy. Internal costs linked to influence activities that encourage division or individual self-interest, such as bargaining costs in inter-divisional exchanges (Poppo, 1995) , may offset the advantages of internal control. Influence activities are politically motivated actions that further employees' private gain and do not serve the organization's best interest (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990) . This line of reasoning deemphasizes the relevance of asset specificity and argues that boundary decisions turn on other factors. Other arguments hold that transaction cost reasoning is atemporal, in the sense that it describes the optimal firm boundaries at a given time but does not make predictions as to the original source of the internalised capabilities. We aim to combine the core predictions of TCE with those of other theoretical perspectives, focusing on knowledge-based and institution-based factors, which will help tease out issues of internal failures and dynamic sourcing choices.
Knowledge-based attributes. In contrast to a perspective based on the failure to align incentives in a market as an explanation for the choice between internal development or external modes of acquisition, the resource-based view of strategy and knowledge-based theories begin with the view that firms are repository of capabilities and emphasize capability gaps as primary drivers of governance mode (Penrose, 1959; Nelson and Winter 1982) .
The resource-based view posits that a firm's specific capabilities determine the range of strategic options that the firm can use to create new resources (Penrose, 1959) . The basis on which the firm makes this decision is its assessment of the distance between its existing capabilities and the targeted capabilities, that is, when strategically important expertise is unavailable or inadequate internally to support the development of this capability (Leonard, 1995) . In addition, providing capabilities that require a different set of skills and knowledge can be time-consuming for firms that lack experience in requisite activities.
When the capability gap is narrow, a firm can typically make the effort to develop the targeted capabilities internally (Leonard, 1995) , assuming that these capabilities are critical to the strategy (otherwise, capabilities that the firm is familiar with and capable in but that are low in strategic value may be outsourced to specialist firms). When the capability gap is wide, i.e., when the firm possesses only a limited subset of the skills required to develop the new capabilities, firms seek to acquire them from outside the firm (Penrose, 1959) .
Drawing on the resource-based view, the diversification and mode of entry literatures examine the relationship between capability gap and mode of entry. RBV and diversification arguments hold that the type of diversification and the mode of entry are directly related. An entrant with a high degree of relatedness to a market favors direct entry (Yip, 1982; Chatterjee, 1990) . As a rule, the probability that an entrant's current excess physical and knowledge-based resources can reduce operating costs in a new market is higher the more related the new market is to the entrant's core markets (Teece, 1982) . If an entrant expects a large reduction in operating costs from excess resources and requires few complementary resources, it is likely to prefer direct entry. Conversely, for unrelated entrants, external development helps a firm acquire skills needed to compete in the new industry. Unrelated entrants will gain fewer reductions in operating costs from using excess resources and face higher requirements for complementary resources (Chatterjee, 1990) .
Empirical studies in the strategy literature have found that markets that firms are familiar with and have resources that can be readily leverage favor de novo entry (Busija, et al., 1997; Sharma, 1998) . Empirical studies in the foreign direct entry (FDI) literature generally support this pattern showing that as Japanese firms enter new lines of business in the U.S., they prefer joint ventures or acquisitions to greenfield investment (Hennart and Park, 1993) . Similarly, Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) found that firms that expanded abroad into related industries were more likely to set up new ventures than firms expanding into unrelated businesses, which were more likely to acquire existing firms.
In parallel, the knowledge-based perspective emphasizes organizational factors that constrain firms to develop new capabilities closely related to their existing capabilities. As a result, the firm's search process for new capabilities is likely to be local, in the sense that a firm is likely to search in the neighborhood of its current technological position (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Dosi, 1982) . Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that firms tend to undertake internal changes that build on their existing ability to evaluate and utilize particular knowledge, which they refer to as absorptive capacity.
The notion of local search suggests that the organization focuses inwardly by relying on internally generated developments (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) . As the firm moves away from its knowledge base, its probability of success converges to that for a start-up operation (Kogut and Zander, 1992) . The firm may even consider abandoning the development of the targeted capabilities if the knowledge gap is too wide. The alternative to abandonment can be to search outside the firm and attempt to import external knowledge that the firm could not have created with its existing internal routines. Kogut (1992) argues that firms develop internally projects that build related capabilities and rely on joint ventures or acquisitions when the capabilities are distantly related. Similarly, Cuervo-Cazurra (1999) argues that firms develop capabilities internally once they have already achieved a competitive level close to that required for effective competition, and will seek externally when they face a large competitive gap.
Empirical evidence suggests that firms focus their search process for new capabilities on closely related technological domains (Helfat, 1997; Martin and Mitchell, 1998) . In their study on the development of technological variation among Japanese semiconductor companies, Stuart and Polodny (1996) find that Matsushita, through the extensive use of alliances with other firms that gave them access to different technologies, was able to reposition itself technologically by moving away from local search.
In parallel, the acquisitions and alliances literatures show that managers often search for targets or allies with strong capabilities that complement the acquiring firm's weaknesses, planning to redeploy the stronger capabilities from the target (Capron, 1999) or use the ally's strength (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Dussauge, Garrette, and Mitchell, 2000) . Examining the product line evolution of firms in the U.S. medical equipment sector, Karim and Mitchell (2000) find that acquisitions provide opportunities for undertaking path-breaking changes by seeking targets that offer resources that differ markedly from a firm's existing skills. They also found that acquirers were more likely than non-acquirers to possess resources that have only recently entered the industry, suggesting that firms that use internal development are more likely to pursuing path-dependent change than path-breaking changes. Examining the evolutionary patterns of 25 firms over three decades, Barkema and Vermeulen (2001) find that acquisitions can broaden a firm's knowledge base and decrease its inertia. Through acquisitions, firms both acquire unfamiliar new capabilities and learn how to use their existing capabilities in new organizational settings and competitive conditions (Mitchell, 1994; Singh and Zollo, 1997) . In their study on the optical disk industry, Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) find that radical exploration builds upon distant technology that resides outside of the firm, while local search builds upon similar technology residing within the firm. These works suggest that spanning interfirm boundaries leads to spanning more technological boundaries.
Studies in the foreign direct investment literature, meanwhile, show that firms with strong technological capabilities have less need to buy or ally with existing firms and are more likely to enter foreign markets through greenfield ventures (Hennart and Park, 1993) . That is, greater capability strength relative to local firms favors the choice of internally developed investment rather than alliance or acquisition. In general, a firm has greater incentives to develop new capabilities internally when the firm has a strong competitive position in the targeted area.
In summary, we expect that firms will resort to external modes when the strategic gap between the targeted capabilities and the existing capabilities is wide, and to internal modes when the gap is narrow.
Hypothesis 2. A firm is likely to use internal development rather than external sourcing when the strategic gap between the targeted capabilities and the firm's existing capabilities is narrow.
Institution-based attributes.
Complementing the RBV and knowledge-based perspectives, which focus on strategic gaps as explanations for the choice between internal development and external sourcing , evolutionary and institutional theories emphasize the role of social stability and legitimacy as key underlying enabling factors of capability development (Nelson and Winter 1982; Kogut and Zander, 1992; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1997 ).
As we noted earlier, the evolutionary view stresses that firms learn in areas closely related to their existing capabilities. Kogut and Zander (1992) argue that individual limitations in learning new skills are not a sufficient explanation of the localized search. What makes the capability search localized is that proximate capabilities do not require change in an organization's recipes of organizing research. In other words, firm tend to develop capabilities that do not disrupt their existing routines and processes, thereby maintaining the social fabric that weaves together the firm's capabilities (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982) .
Therefore, switching to new capabilities is difficult, both because the social knowledge embedded in the current capabilities is only partially understood and it is unclear what social fabric would be required to support the new learning (Kogut and Zander, 1992) . It is the stability of this social fabric within existing relationships that yields valuable firm specific capabilities. At the same time, the fear of disrupting existing routines and social stability is a powerful force tending to hold organizations on relatively inflexible paths.
The evolutionary argument concerning social relationships yields a boundary condition concerning internal and external sourcing. Nelson and Winter (1982) stress that a firm's irreversible investments and limited range of operating routines constrain its ability to develop and use capabilities within the firm, so that firms turn to external sources when their existing routines differ from the routines needed to create new capabilities. Internal development will be more common for capabilities that reinforce the existing systems and build incrementally on existing routines. Conversely, when a firm needs capabilities that conflict with its existing routines, it will turn to external modes of change to gain access to routines that internal people will not or can not develop within the firm. External sourcing of capabilities that disrupt the firm's existing routines provides a means of overcoming internal barriers to developing such needed capabilities.
In parallel, although starting from a different research tradition, the institutional view argues that the firm's institutional context, and notably the social legitimacy and political acceptance of its capabilities, is key to capability sourcing decisions. From an institutional perspective, firms operate within a social framework of norms, values, and taken-for granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable economic behavior (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987) . These institutional factors surrounding resource decisions constrain the potential of firms to develop new capabilities (Oliver, 1997; Ginsberg, 1994) . Firms are more likely to be able to develop resources that are socially accepted. Developing capabilities that depart from firm values and traditions entail internal resistance and social rejection. Social rejection is even more severe when the targeted capabilities compete with or replace the firm's existing capabilities. Replacing the firm's existing capabilities with new ones, even when those changes are economically rational, is likely to entail social rejection as individuals are reluctant to alter entrenched organizations habits and switch to less familiar practices. Individuals may also perceive the replacement of traditional capabilities and practices with new ones as disloyal to firm norms and values (Oliver, 1997) .
The presence of cognitive sunk costs, which are the "social and psychological costs associated with altering firm habits and routines" (Oliver, 1997: 702) , leads managers to reinforce the existing capability position and makes internal development for radically new capabilities less likely. As a result, firms are more likely to turn to external sourcing for capabilities that face social rejection, i.e., depart significantly from the firm's traditions, culture, and value. When capabilities require significant change, and particularly if the needed changes conflict with the existing capabilities, firms will tend to use external sourcing modes. The core reason is that the firm will have less need to attempt immediately to adjust existing routines in the face of substantial resistance. Instead, the firm can attempt to obtain new capabilities from outside the firm and only then undertake the process of adjusting existing routines. In extreme cases of social rejection, the firm might also consider abandoning external pursuit of the needed capabilities. We refer to the degree to which a capability fits with a firm's existing social institutions as internal legitimacy.
The notion of internal legitimacy complements the earlier discussion of capability gaps, because the social conflict involves non-rational, emotional components of the firm's capacity to develop new capabilities internally. Internal development of capabilities that build on new routines meets institutional barriers. The targeted capabilities might, in theory, be close to existing skills of people but also might, in practice, violate corporate traditions, break people's working routines, and disrupt the organization by bringing about internal competition. Oliver (1997: 701) notes that "Whereas knowledge-based theorists assume that managers make rational choices bounded by uncertainty, information limitations, and heuristic bias, institutional theorists assume that managers commonly make nonrational choices bounded by social judgment, historical limitations, and the inertial force of habit".
The internal legitimacy argument closely parallels Abernathy and Clark's (1985) and Tushman and Anderson's (1986) notion of competence destruction, which arises when new capabilities will reduce the value of existing capabilities. The initial argument concerning competence destruction is that firms will tend to avoid changes that involve substantial competence destruction. An extension of the argument, though, is that the presence of competence destruction will influence the mode of capability sourcing of firms that attempt to change despite the potential for competence destruction. Most often firms will search externally in such cases, rather than undertake the immediate risk of attempting to change existing routines and social institutions.
Empirical studies provide support for the institutional view. In several case studies, Menon and Pfeffer (2001) find that managers tend to view external knowledge more favorably than internal knowledge for reasons of internal competition and self-enhancement. They argue that, when the targeted capabilities pose status threats for insiders, external sourcing may provide a better solution due to the high symbolic and social costs of using internal knowledge. These status threats are less present when acquiring knowledge from more indirect external sources.
In summary, we expect that firms will resort to external sourcing when the targeted capabilities face social rejection and resort to internal development when the targeted capabilities fit with the firm's existing social institutions.
Hypothesis 3. A firm is likely to use internal development rather than external sourcing when the targeted capabilities are consistent with the firm's existing social institutions.
Alternative Explanations: External Constraints
Rather than being an outcome of the capability exchange attributes, the choice of internal development may reflect the firm's inability to pursue external modes of capability acquisition due to the lack of external availability or tradability of the targeted capabilities or the firm's difficulties to import the targeted capabilities from external sources into its own context. We aim to test these two propositions and their relative relevance compared to the previous set of propositions.
External availability. Firms may need to turn to internal sourcing when targeted capabilities do not exist outside the firm. This situation can arise with emerging capabilities, for which the internal development is the only option available to the firm. Firms also may not be able to resort to external sources when the targeted capabilities, even if they do exist externally, can not be traded through markets or across firms. Resource-based theorists argue that imperfect mobility is a prerequisite for a resource to sustain any competitive advantage (Peteraf, 1993) . Some theorists maintain that there exist reasonably competitive, albeit imperfect, markets for strategic resources (Barney, 1986) . By contrast, others assert that unique and valuable resources are not tradable (Dierickx and Cool, 1989) . Competitors that need a nontradable resource are constrained to develop it internally through steady investments accumulated over time. The dynamism and efficiency of markets also can vary across period of time and geographical areas.
For example, the market for corporate control and the enforcement of contract and property rights vary significantly depending on the institutional regime in which the firm operates (Oxley, 1999) . Thus, firms will be more reluctant to turn to external sourcing when they perceive the markets for trading the targeted capabilities as nonexistent or highly inefficient.
Hypothesis 4: A firm is likely to use internal development rather than external sourcing when it perceives the market for trading targeted capabilities as nonexistent or highly inefficient.
Importation capacity. Targeted capabilities, even if they exist and reside within external partners, may not be easily imported into the firm's specific context. We previously argued that firms might not be able to develop targeted capabilities internally due to the lack of absorptive capacity. Similarly, firms may not be able to obtain external resources due to their lack of importation capacity. Some capabilities can be difficult to trade because they require complex organizational processes to protect, integrate, and diffuse them within the receiving firm. The inherent nature of the targeted capabilities can force a firm to set up safeguarding devices, sophisticated coordination mechanisms, and lengthy procedures to adapt the imported knowledge into the firm's context. Transferring capabilities across firms can require ongoing cooperation between the seller and the buyer so that the purchasing firm will be capable of reproducing an appropriate context in terms of culture, processes, and incentive systems to obtain the value from the new capabilities. Capabilities, when transferred outside of their original setting, lose part of their value because firms are not capable of providing a suitable home for the transferred capability. Reproducing this context or adjusting knowledge to the buyer's context requires a tight coupling between the seller and the buyer, which is not easily enforceable in external markets. As a result, a firm that faces difficulties in importing the targeted capabilities into its own context is less likely to undertake external sourcing than internal development.
Hypothesis 5. A firm is likely to use internal development rather than external sourcing when it lacks the capacity to import targeted capabilities into its own context.
Moderating Effects: The Firm's Search Attributes
Finally, we consider the moderating influence that the firm's search processes, i.e., its capacity to search within and outside the firm, have on the firm's choice to pursue internal development or external sourcing. The firm's ability to recombine its internal capabilities and recombine them with acquired capabilities takes its theoretical roots in the dynamic capabilities view (Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997) . Dynamic capabilities are "the antecedent organizational and strategic routines by which managers alter their resource base -acquire and shed resources, integrate them together, and recombine them-to generate new value-creating strategies" Martin, 2000:1107) . Reconfiguring firm capabilities can take place within the firm (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 1996; Szulanski, 1996; Hansen, 1999) or by establishing linkages with external partners (Gulati, 1999; Capron, Mitchell and Swaminathan, 2001 ). Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) distinguish between internal boundaryspanning exploration and external boundary-spanning exploration. Similarly, Kogut and Zander (1992) define combinative capability as the ability to synthesize and apply current and acquired knowledge.
Internal reconfiguration routines. Firms differ in their ability to recombine internal capabilities into new configurations of capabilities (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Galunic and Rodan, 1998) . Internal reconfiguration requires that firms develop efficient routines for conducting internal search and processes to make internal capabilities readily available and transferable within the firm. We previously argued that firms that wished to develop capabilities that are close to their existing capabilities and would reinforce existing routines and social values were more likely to pursue internal development than external development. However, what might prevent a firm that has relevant capabilities and systems to develop such capabilities internally? One major impediment is the lack of efficient internal processes that allow the firm itself to tap into its internal capabilities and recombine them into new configurations, which we refer to as internal reconfiguration routines.
We expect firms to develop their internal reconfiguration routines as they gain experience in internal development. By experience, we mean the extent to which the firm has engaged and invested in internal development in the past, and the success of prior experience. Firms that frequently undertake internal development will develop and retain relevant routines to recombine and add to existing routines in order to create new capabilities. Examples include knowledge sharing incentives, hiring routines, and employee integration mechanisms such as active internal labor markets, job rotation, transversal committees, and internal consulting services. These arguments parallel the literatures on intra-firm social networks (Tsai, 2000) . For instance, Hansen (1999) shows that the existence of strong ties across business units facilitates intraorganizational transfer of complex knowledge. By contrast, when such mechanisms are weak, the firm will have greater need to turn to external sourcing modes if it wishes to develop new capabilities.
In sum, firms that possess effective internal reconfiguration routines are able to reduce the extent of internal stickiness that interferes with efforts to share knowledge among organizational subunits and build on a firm's existing capabilities (Szulanski, 1996) . In contrast, firms with weak internal reconfiguration routines tend to suffer from internal stickiness. As a result, even if a firm possesses relevant capabilities to develop the targeted capabilities, it may not be able to do so if its lacks the capacity to incorporate the new skills with its existing internal knowledge. We expect internal reconfiguration routines to moderate the relationship between the capability exchange attributes and the decision to pursue internal development.
Hypothesis 6a: The stronger a firm's internal reconfiguration routines, the more influence that contractual hazards will have on the choice of internal development.
Hypothesis 6b: The stronger a firm's internal reconfiguration routines, the more influence that narrow strategic gaps will have on the choice of internal development.
Hypothesis 6c: The stronger a firm's internal reconfiguration routines, the more influence that internal legitimacy will have on the choice of internal development.
External reconfiguration routines.
Firms also differ in their ability to trade in capabilities, i.e., to scan their external environments, negotiate with and protect against undesired leakage to external partners, and recombine imported capabilities with their existing capabilities.
External reconfiguration requires that firms develop efficient routines for conducting external search and processes to identify, import, and leverage external capabilities. External reconfiguration also requires firms to adjust internal routines, particularly for capabilities that are far away from internal capabilities. We refer to these processes as external reconfiguration routines.
We expect firms to develop their external reconfiguration routines as they gain experience in external sourcing. Firms with many external linkages to other organizations tend to have greater access to substantial elements of capabilities that reside outside the firm. Strong ties with external partners facilitate identification of an appropriate seller, enforcement of contracts, and transfer of complex knowledge. Familiarity breeds trust and tighter collaboration and facilitate the exchanges of capabilities that are difficult to value and transfer via external ties (Ahuja, 2000; Uzzi; . A firm's ability to deal with external knowledge sources is likely to influence its perception of the availability and tradability of targeted capabilities. First, firms that possess effective external reconfiguration routines are able to reduce the difficulties in searching and trading in capabilities from external sources, so that limits on external availability will create fewer constraints.
Hypothesis 7a: The stronger a firm's external reconfiguration routines, the less influence that limits on external capability availability will have on the choice of internal development.
Second, firms with strong external reconfiguration routines tend to suffer less from market failures. Therefore, we expect external reconfiguration routines to moderate the relationship between importation capacity and the decision to pursue internal development.
Hypothesis 7b: The stronger a firm's external reconfiguration routines, the less influence that a firm's importation capacity will have on the choice of internal development.
METHODS
Empirical Setting
We chose the international telecom sector as a fruitful arena in which to study modes of capability sourcing. Throughout much of the world, telecom network operation and service provision have been changing rapidly during the past two decades, owing to changes in the regulatory, technical, competitive, and market environments (Beardsley, Raghunath, and Wilshire, 2000) . Deregulation has brought about many changes to network operation. In the U.S. Competition in the network operation segment also has implications for the service provision segment of the telecommunications industry. As the battle for access to infrastructure heats up, pure infrastructure providers run the risk of seeing much of the value in the industry accrue to content providers and aggregators, potentially relegating infrastructure providers to the role of commodity sellers of bandwidth. To prosper, infrastructure providers must secure customer relationships by offering distinctive value-added services. The market for most enhanced services is highly competitive and firms with strong information technology competencies are challenging telecom incumbents (Armstrong, 1998) . Therefore, telecom firms face strong incentives to obtain new capabilities, owing to the extensive environmental changes that are affecting the industry.
Changes that firms in the industry seek to undertake emphasize four key aspects of Schumpeter's (1934) change typology: products, production processes, markets, and organization. Most strikingly, changes in the telecom sector entail more than changing a firm's capability endowment; change also means transforming the firm's organization and the processes needed to integrate new capabilities. The telecom sector, including the information technology area within it, suits this research because the firms have used extensive internal and external capability acquisition to create new capabilities and change their internal organizations.
Sample and Data
Our data consist of survey responses from 162 telecommunications firms operating in Europe, North America, South America, or Asia. During late 2000 and early 2001, following detailed in-person pretesting, we mailed the survey to firms throughout the industry. The survey asked senior managers to assess the incentives, prevalence, and success with the four modes of capability acquisition, as well as answer questions concerning barriers to creating capabilities and general firm demographics. We asked them to answer the survey from either the perspective of their entire corporation or their business unit, depending on the scope of their responsibilities.
Owing to senior managerial level from which we needed responses and the length of the survey instrument, which included more than 250 questions and 20 pages of text, we sampled heavily.
We were able to obtain names and addresses for about 1,500 firms and senior managers, with about 40% based in the United States, 40% based in Europe, and the remainder distributed throughout the world. Overall, our response rate is 11%; the extent of the information that we were able to obtain balances the moderate response rate. In this sample, we handed the questionnaire directly to 90 senior executives of leading telecom and IT firms with whom we have a direct and privileged contact as they were attending Telecom Strategy Executive Programs at our universities. We obtained a response rate of 30% for this population (27 participants). We caution that, like any survey, one must interpret the responses in the context of the characteristics of the responding firms. Table 1 reports demographic characteristics of the respondent firms. The respondents have extensive geographic dispersion of home countries, with 20% based in the U.S., 43% in Western Europe, 10% in Northern Europe, 8% in Southern Europe, and 5% in the Asia Pacific region. The responses provide a reasonable size distribution, with about 33% having fewer than 500 employees, 27% having 500-5000 employees, and 39% having more than 5,000 employees.
About half have less then $500 million annual corporate sales, while the other half have up to $60 billion corporate sales. Firm profitability also varied widely, in terms of both ROA and ROE. Similarly, the geographic scope of the respondent's activities varied widely. Firm age is the main factor that clusters more strikingly, with 69% of the respondents being more than 10 years old. In addition, most respondents have a high proportion of their sales in the telecom industry, often complemented by sales in the information technology (IT) sector (there is some overlap of the telecom and IT sectors). Thus, the sample reflects a wide variety of established traditional telecommunications firms. ********** Table 1 here **********
Measures
We used scale-based measures to assess the drivers of the choice between internal development and external sourcing. The composite reliability values for the constructs range from 0.65 to 0.95, all above the cutoff suggested by Baggozi and Yi (1988) . We based the items in the constructs on the firms' responses to questions that asked them to assess the extent to which the drivers we identified earlier (contractual hazards, strategic gaps, internal legitimacy, capability external availability, and importation capacity) led them to use internal development rather than external modes of change.
Contractual hazards.
A three-item Likert scale (1 to 7, strongly disagree to strongly agree) assessed how contractual hazards influenced the choice of internal development over external sourcing. One item recorded the extent to which the firms wished to have full control of the targeted capabilities. Two items assessed the extent to which the targeted capabilities would differentiate the firm from its competitors and the extent to which the firm wished to protect its differentiated capabilities, based on the argument that such differentiation tends to involve the idiosyncratic assets that typically face high levels of market failure. The higher the score, the more that the contractual hazards influence internal development. The reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of the scale is 0.65.
Strategic gap.
A five-item Likert scale assessed how the gap between the targeted capabilities and the firm's existing capabilities influenced the choice of internal development over external sourcing. Two items pertained to whether the firm was familiar with the targeted market, and three items pertained to whether the firm's existing technical, marketing or managerial capabilities were closely related to the targeted capabilities. The higher the score, the more that a narrow strategic gap influences internal development. The reliability of the scale is 0.77.
Internal legitimacy.
A four-item Likert scale assessed how internal legitimacy influenced the choice of internal development over external sourcing. One item assessed the extent to which the targeted capabilities fit with the firm's internal systems. Three items assessed the extent to which the new capabilities would create competition, resistance, and obsolescence among the firm's existing capabilities. The higher the score, the more that internal legitimacy influences internal development. The reliability of the scale is 0.73.
Capability external availability.
A five-item Likert scale assessed how external availability influenced the choice of internal development over external sourcing. Two items addressed whether the targeted capabilities were available from external partners and if they were of good quality. Three items assessed the extent to which the firm had access to active external markets, alliance markets, and acquisition markets. The higher the score, the more that limited external availability influences internal development. The reliability of the scale is 0.72.
Importation capacity. A four-item Likert scale assessed how importation capacity
influenced the choice of internal development over external sourcing used. Three items addressed whether the firm was able to protect, learn, and diffuse within the firm the imported capabilities. One item addressed the firm's ability to manage external sourcing. The higher the score, the more that limited importation capacity influences internal development. The reliability of the scale is 0.69.
Firm internal reconfiguration routines. The indirect effect of how internal
reconfiguration routines influenced the choice of internal development over external sourcing drew on a five-item Likert scale. Three items pertained to the firm's experience with internal development, measured by frequency, investment, and internal training. Two items recorded the extent to which the firm possessed culture and incentive systems to encourage internal development and sharing of capabilities within the firm. The higher the score, the stronger the firm's internal reconfiguration routines. The reliability of the scale is 0.77.
Firm external reconfiguration routines. The indirect effect of how external reconfiguration routines influenced the choice of internal development over external sourcing drew on a five-item Likert scale for each external sourcing mode (purchase contract, alliances, acquisitions), representing 15 items in total. We took the mean value of these three modes. For each mode, three items addressed the firm's mode experience, and two items addressed the firm's culture and incentive systems to encourage that mode. The higher the score, the stronger the firm's external reconfiguration routines. The reliability of the scale is 0.88 for purchase contract, 0.93 for alliance, and 0.95 for acquisitions.
Control variables.
In sensitivity analysis, we examined the influence of twelve control variables. "Firm size" denoted the number of employees of the firm at the corporate level. "Firm profitability" accounted for the firm's return on asset. "Firm R&D intensity" and "Firm advertising intensity" reflected the proportion of the firm's sales to R&D and advertising expenses, respectively. "Firm age" accounted for the age of the firm. "Firm telecom share" and "Firm IT share" recorded the proportion of the firm's corporation sales in the telecommunications and IT industry, respectively. "Firm geographic scope" referred to the geographical spread of the firm's operations at a corporate level. "U.S. firm" recorded whether the company was based in the United States. "Western Europe firm" recorded whether the company was based in Western Europe. "State-owned firm" reflected whether the firm was owned in majority by the State. "Recently privatized firm" reflected whether the firm had been privatized in the past five years.
Appendix 1 presents the variables and lists the final items in the scale-based measures. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the variables that we used in the analysis. ********** Table 2 here **********
Data Reliability
Several steps assess the quality of the survey instrument and measures: 1) content validity of our measures through an extensive pre-testing process based on expert panel assessment, cross validation with interviews of senior executives, and a pilot test; 2) careful design of the survey through the sequence of questions and use of multiple items; 3) analysis of reliability a nd discriminant validity of the measures, and 4) analysis of respondent bias.
Content validity.
The survey process proceeded in four phases. In the first phase, we developed measurement scales by reviewing the relevant literature and by conducting twentyfive on-site interviews with CEOs from large firms, academics, and consultants in the telecommunications and IT industries. This first phase led us to generate a rich list of items pertaining to our core theoretical constructs. In the second phase, we pre-tested the preliminary version of the questionnaire in site interviews and with senior executives who were attending telecommunications executive education programs at our business schools located in the United States and in Europe. The executives had a wide range of backgrounds, including finance, marketing, and production. The pretests aimed at ensuring that the respondents understood the questions in the context that we intended. This second phase led us to clarify some questions and to add items that the executives suggested. Our third stage consisted of a pilot survey using the revised survey instrument during on-site interviews with CEOs and executives in charge of corporate development. This resulted in the final version of the questionnaire. We base the content validity of our measures on this careful process of developing the categories and pretesting the questions. In the fourth stage of the data collection process, we designed and administered the mail survey under guidelines established in Dillman's (1978) Total Design Method. We addressed the surveys to the chief executives in charge of corporate development.
We also sent two follow-up letters and two replacement questionnaires within the three weeks following the first mail. Appendix 2 lists responding firms that agreed to be cited as participants of this survey.
Survey design.
In our survey design, we separated items specific to constructs from each other to minimize consistency bias. We also introduced control questions at different points. For example, for the use of a specific sourcing mode, we introduced questions pertaining to the frequency, the ranking of that mode compared to other modes, and the degree of investment in that mode. We deleted the few cases that lacked convergence across similar questions.
The survey design addressed concerns about biases that might arise from response styles.
We worded some items in a scale positively and other items negatively, to control for stylistic responding because a high (low) score cannot be obtained simply because of yea-saying (naysaying) (Baumgartner and Steenkamp, 2001) . We also performed paired-samples t-test to compare the means across pairs of drivers (e.g., market failures versus strategic gaps). This procedure computes the differences between values of the two variables for each respondent and tests whether the average differs from 0. For the nine pairs of drivers, seven exhibited significant differences, which suggests that respondents were able to discriminate among the questions.
Finally, we asked the respondents to reflect on their practices of internal development and external sourcing modes of the last three to five years to avoid requiring that they select a successful transaction, which would introduce sample selection bias. Thus, we require them to analyze their own practices and draw general rules and patterns of behavior.
Measure reliability and discriminant validity. To examine the drivers of internal development versus external sourcing, we use multiple scale measures to enrich the reliability of our data. Cronbach's alpha ranged from 0.65 to 0.95. We also performed a factor analysis to ensure that each item associated with its appropriate construct. Table 2 reflects the low correlations across the theoretical constructs.
Respondent bias. We performed several tests to address respondent bias. We compared the industry and geographical profile of the respondent and non-respondent samples. The data set has a broad distribution of acquiring and target firms across all the countries in the sample, although Western European firms and U.S. firms are somewhat over-represented in the data set and Asian firms are somewhat under-represented. This is due to our superior access to the European and American executives.
We undertook several respondent comparisons. We compared the financial and economic profile of the 27 Executive Program respondents with whom we have direct access to the 63 Executive Program participants who did not respond, and did not find significant differences. We also compared the patterns of responses of these 27 Executive Program respondents and the rest of the respondents of our sample, and found no differences. Finally, we found no material differences in the responses of early and late respondents, on the assumption that later respondents will tend to share characteristics with non-respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977) . Overall, we believe that the data reflect representative characteristics of established firms in the telecommunications industry and, more generally, of firms that operate in rapidly changing and technologically-intensive industries.
Statistical methods
To test the propositions concerning the drivers of the choice of internal development versus external sourcing (Propositions 1 to 5), we used t-tests to measure whether the mean of each variable differs from the mid-point value of the scale (4.0), which was the neutral point between "fully agree" and "fully disagree" in the survey. To explore the respective predictive power of these five drivers, we used paired-samples t-tests to compare the mean difference for the nine pairs of drivers we have in our model. To test the propositions concerning the moderating effects of the firm's internal and external reconfiguration routines on the relationship between those five drivers and the choice of internal versus external sourcing, we used the independent-samples t-test procedure that compares the means of each driver for two groups of firms: firms with low versus high internal or external reconfiguration routines. We used the same procedure to test the effect of the control variables. Table 3 reports the tests of hypotheses 1 through 3. The results support the three capability exchange attribute predictions. Internal sourcing is more likely for resources that face contractual hazards (H1), have low gaps relative to existing resources (H2), and have high internal legitimacy (H3). Thus, transaction cost theory, the resource and knowledge based views, and institutional and evolutionary perspectives offer complementary explanations for firms' choices between internal and external capability sourcing. ********** Table 3 here ********** Table 4 explores the relative predictive power of the three capability exchange attributes.
RESULTS
Among the three pairs, only one has a significant difference, with contractual hazards having somewhat greater effect than internal legitimacy. The other two comparisons suggest equivalent impact on sourcing choices: the importance of strategic gaps is similar to both contractual hazards and internal legitimacy. Overall, then, the internal context of strategic gap and internal legitimacy tends to be as important as transaction attributes in determining sourcing decisions. ********** Table 4 here ********** Table 3 also reports the tests of the hypotheses 4 and 5, concerning capability external availability and a firm's importation capacity. The tests did not support either hypothesis. That is, problems of external constraints did not drive the firms' sourcing decisions. Thus, internal development is not simply a default option due to the firm's inability to pursue external growth, but much more a deliberate choice that firms make after assessing the characteristics of the capabilities that they desire.
In Table 4 , we explore the relative predictive power of each of the three capability exchange drivers versus the external constraints. We find significant differences for the six pairs of variables, suggesting that internal development is driven more by contractual hazard, strategic gap, and internal legitimacy than by external availability or importation difficulties. This reinforces the conclusion that firms base sourcing decisions on capabilities attributes, rather than simply using default options that external constraints impose. Table 5 reports the tests of H6, concerning the moderating effects of internal reconfiguration routines. The results support the predictions. The stronger a firm's internal reconfiguration routines, the more that high contractual hazards (H6a), narrow gaps (H6b), and high internal legitimacy (H6c) lead to internal development. ********** Table 5 here ********** Table 5 also reports the tests of H7, concerning the moderating effects of external reconfiguration routines. The results support H7b, but do not support H7a. The stronger the firm's external reconfiguration routines, the less that importation difficulties influence the choice of internal development (H7b). That is, firms with weak external reconfiguration routines perceive the difficulties imposed by limited importation capacities as a stronger driver of the choice of internal development than firms with strong external reconfiguration routines. By contrast, external reconfiguration routines have no moderating influence on the effect of external capability availability (H7a). This null result for H7a reinforces the limited influence of external resource availability, which Table 3 showed to have no main effect on sourcing decisions.
We examined the moderating impact of the control variables in sensitivity analyses. Four variables produced significant influences. First, firms with high R&D intensity put more emphasis on contractual hazard threats. Second, large firms put less emphasis on internal legitimacy. Third, large firms have weaker internal reconfiguration routines and stronger external reconfiguration routines. Fourth, older firms have stronger external reconfiguration routines.
DISCUSSION
This research compares how three types of capability attributes and two types of external constraints influence firms' sourcing decisions. We show that three conceptual perspectives concerning capability attributes -transaction cost, knowledge-based, and institutional arguments -provide complementary influences on firms' capability sourcing decisions. Firms tend to develop capabilities internally when they face high contractual hazards, narrow capability gaps, or high internal legitimacy. In parallel, firms seek externally when capabilities have lower contractual risks, wide gaps, or low legitimacy. By contrast, we show that external availability and the strength of firms' importation capacities have much weaker influence on sourcing decisions. The key implication of this set of results is that sourcing decisions involve choices between options rather than default options in the face of strong external constraints.
We also investigate how internal and external reconfiguration routines influence sourcing decisions. We show that strong internal reconfiguration routines moderate the capability attributes: the stronger a firm's internal reconfiguration routines, the stronger the influence of capability attributes on sourcing decisions. External reconfiguration routines also have a moderating influence, such that firms with weak importation capabilities and weak external reconfiguration routines are particularly likely to use internal development as a change mode.
The key implication of this set of results is that firms differ in their abilities to combine resources in the process of creating new capabilities and, in turn, these differences influence the modes of change that they undertake.
The overall implication of the results is that no one existing theory dominates in explaining how firms attempt to change themselves. Instead, we require a richer conceptual perspective that combines issues of opportunism, knowledge, and institutional forces.
Firms face strong inertial forces that limit their abilities to change. At the same time, though, firms face strong competitive pressures to undertake ongoing changes or risk failing.
Economists and organization theorists have developed strong theories concerning both the inertial forces and the needs for change. Strategists now need to develop new theories concerning the intersection between the inertial and dynamic pressures. We believe that such theories of business dynamics can usefully explore the complementary influences of contractual risks, knowledge bases, and institutional forces. (items 32-36) and purchase contracts (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) .
